1.1 The original is well meaning but not well crafted. The reflection of will to build a common future is a bit weak. The amendment says it is a determination to build a future "together".

Structurally speaking, there are two separate thoughts in the clause: first, the establishment of the Union; second the provisions of the Constitution. It needs two sentences.

In the second sentence we have kept together the same collective of peoples and states. People as well as states will be involved in the democratic processes. It would be a pity to drop them out of the picture so early.

'States' should be lower case, as are the peoples, here and elsewhere (eg. 1.3).

1.2 That the Union respects national identities is nothing to do with the establishment of the Union. It is a value judgement, and therefore should appear in Article 2.

2.1 The formulation of 'shared' rather than 'common' values is to indicate a positive commitment to the unity of Europe. 'Common' is a more passive concept.

Liberty takes priority in a list of values.

If we have 'human dignity' already we need the wider notion of 'fundamental' rights, which is also consistent with the Charter.

A reference to the value of European culture is surely desirable at this point, as is the idea of promoting by example what it is we as Europeans practise.

2.2 This clause is taken over from Article 1. 2. The qualification of national identities being 'of its Member States' is dropped in the interests of pluralism and historical accuracy. There are many national identities within the states of Europe.

Likewise we include regional identities. The Constitution must cater for the emergence of a post-national democratic identity with flourishing regions and localities.

3.1 It is repetitive to refer again to peace and values here as they have just been promoted as aims in different formulations in the previous articles.

3.2 The 'well-being of its peoples' is taken over from Article 3.1.

It is vital that we get the formulation of the concept of sustainable development right here, thereby making a significant improvement on Article 2 TEC. All three aspects - economic, social and ecological - have to feature in this core statement of the Union's objectives.

Here and elsewhere, by splitting sentences, let us try to eliminate the strings of subordinate clauses that have lengthened during the incremental development of the current Treaties.

We do not really understand the concept of 'free single market'. The single market is neither without cost nor regulation.

Surely we can refer to our cultural and educational objectives here?

Space exploration is only one (important) category of R & D, and policy in this sector should be relegated to Part Two.

We include here as an objective of the Union the fight against discrimination on four of the grounds included in the present Article 13 TEC. This sharpens the reflection of contemporary European norms in the Constitution and recognises the importance attached to non-discriminatory practice at the EU level. These objectives are further explicated in the Charter.

The reference to solidarity between states in this societal context is bizarre, and misplaced.

3.3 The Union does not 'constitute' currently an area of freedom, security and justice. It must, therefore, foster its development as one of its central objectives.

We also add two more grounds for the fight against discrimination, drawn from Article 13 TEC, as being central to the development of the area of freedom, security and justice.

3.4 It is not self-evident that the Constitution should be defensive about Europe's independence or interests.

The adjective 'wider' rather implies that the Union will only export its values and not promote them at home.

Peace deserves promotion here from the bottom of the pile. And the reference to 'between states' needs to go if contemporary realities are to be reflected in the Constitution.

Disease is a scourge on a par with poverty.

The specific mention of children's rights is insufficient here. The EU seeks to advance human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

Observance of international obligations is one thing but the development of international law, for example in the International Criminal Court is another. If Europe is not proactive almost nobody else will be.

3.5 The inclusion of reference to good governance and openness is necessary early on in the Constitution in order to flag up the Union's commitment to best practice in the conduct of its democratic life. These qualities are not fundamental values on a par with those specified in Article 2, but they are a central feature of the wider objectives of the Union.

5.1 Of the options available for the installation of the Charter in the Constitution, its publication as a second chapter of Part One would seem to offer the greatest visibility and comprehension. Its annexation as a Protocol would be equivalent in legal terms, but it would in that case be necessary to spell out (and therefore repeat without divergence) some of the Charter's key points in this Title II.

The Chapter Two solution proposed here would allow the Convention to shorten radically Article 7 on citizenship.

5.2 Although the ECHR is the principal human rights convention, and in the light of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice may need a specific mention in the Constitution, it is not the only one.

7.1 The second sentence of the Praesidium's draft is almost apologetic in tone. The idea that EU citizenship is a supplement to and not a substitute for national citizenship, if needed, can better be rendered by the addition of the word 'also' in the first sentence.

In the last sentence, the reference to 'women and men' is incongruous. What other kind of citizen could there reasonably be?

7.2 The detailed provisions of citizenship are laid down in the Charter and are not necessary to be repeated here on condition that the Charter is incorporated prominently in Part One. It is sensible, in that case, to add an explicit reference to the Charter as being the place where citizens can find their rights.

7.3 is elided with the revised 7.2 in the interests of comprehension.

8.1 We should try to avoid excessively legalistic terminology. The Praesidium's choice of 'limits and use' seems clumsy, and 'loyalty' is better than 'loyal cooperation'.

'Attribution' may indeed be better than 'conferral'.

8.2 The proposed amendment more accurately reflects the status and function of the Constitution.

8.3 The inclusion of regional and local authorities recognises the importance of sub-state levels of government while not exonerating the Member States from their obligations under the Constitution.

9.2 This amendment seeks to extend the application of the principle of subsidiarity to the exclusive competences of the Union. It has always been anomalous that subsidiarity should not inform the decisions of the Union in the areas where it enjoys the greatest concentration of power. The derogation, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, seems out of sympathy with a Union that is seeking to be more consultative, to give greater recognition to the role of regional and local authorities and to decentralise the management of some of its common policies.

In Article 11 we will try to widen the definition of exclusivity to include the application of the four freedoms to internal market matters.

The integration of the Charter also serves to redefine the concept of subsidiarity to embrace the relationship between the individual and the Union authority.

The use of the term Union's 'Institutions' should be minimised. The institutions act for and on behalf of the Union. (In any case here and elsewhere they deserve only lower case.)

9.5 We drop the sentence: "The Union shall act loyally towards the Member States". The Constitution should not legitimise the notion that there is or can be a separation of interests between that of the Union on the one hand and its collective Member States on the other. In the emerging federal constitutional order of states there is a unified purpose and identity and a single institutional system.

9.6 The Praesidium's formulation is repetitive (see their Article 1.2 and our 2.2) in its respect for the national identities of the states. It also makes a presumption about the concept of nation state sovereignty which is not universally shared today. Our amendment is shorter, clearer, simpler and more accurate.

10.2 The draft needs to say explicitly that the EU has the power in the area of shared competence to coordinate the policies of the Member States. That being so, we can neatly delete 10.3 (coordination of economic policy) and 10.4 (coordination of foreign, security and defence policy).

11.1 It would be useful to refer to the description of this category in Article 10.1.

Confusingly, the Praesidium's draft has the four principles behind the foundation and operation of the internal market in the 'exclusive' category but again refers to the internal market as a shared competence in Article 12.4 in which case, under the provisions of Article 10.2, Member States may act only if the Union has not done so.

If we elevate the internal market to the exclusive category, as we propose here, Member States may act only if empowered to do so by the Union. In the field of the internal market the scope of integration and the scale of activity is already very extensive in the existing Union. There is certainly no question of going back on the acquis communautaire. But the recategorisation of the internal market as an exclusive competence would strengthen the Union's role in making a reality of the four freedoms in the enlarged, and possibly more centrifugal Union.

The exclusion of fiscal policy is a safeguard for the Member States in a sensitive area involving national sovereignty. The question of tax harmonisation should therefore be specified as the exception to the rule and remain a shared competence (see Article 12.4).

Moreover, the proposed extension of the application of the principle of subsidiarity into the exclusive category (see Article 9.2) provides an extra assurance.

The reader of the Constitution must be able to see quickly that the Union's principal competence lies in the economic field. Given that the Convention has decided to install this catalogue of exclusive competences, let us not define it either rigidly or absurdly.

For that reason he or she would be confused by the reference to the conservation of marine resources, a lesser issue which is part and parcel of the common fisheries policy (shared competence). An alternative approach would be to elevate the whole Common Fisheries Policy - and, by inference, the Common Agricultural Policy - to the exclusive category. Why not?

12.1 The explanation of this category has already appeared in Article 10.2, allowing us to re-draft this Article in a clearer and shorter version.

12.2 This has already been covered in Article 10.6. It is confusing and unnecessary to repeat it here with slightly different wording.

12.3 This has already been covered in Article 10.2. It is confusing and unnecessary to repeat it here with slightly different wording.

12.4 To accord with Article 11.1 the fiscal aspects of the internal market feature here.

If the internal market can be assumed to be an exclusive competence, as we have suggested, the Common Agricultural Policy and Common Fisheries Policy, being intrinsic parts of the single market regime, should be dropped from this list.

Employment policy is added to social policy as a shared competence. The existing formulations of the Treaty of Amsterdam on employment policy are possibly the worst examples of treaty drafting we have yet seen in the history of the Union. Many members, from all quarters, of the Convention have expressed themselves in favour of more "delivery on jobs". The citizen expects more action from the Union in this field.

The Praesidium has given both research and technological development and development cooperation and humanitarian aid their own special category of shared competence (Articles 12.5 and 12.6) on the grounds that Member States may not be prevented from exercising their own competence in parallel to that of the Union. In other words, there is the concept of active partnership between the EU and national levels in these sectors.

The way that the Constitution treats all shared competences should be standardised. We propose the deletion of Articles 12.5 and 12.6, and the inclusion of these two policy fields alongside the other shared competences in Article 12.4.

The Union already has ample experience of implementing current policies in these two areas, and of achieving the necessary degree of cooperation in practice. Moreover, the concept of parallel action is also present in all the other fields specified in Article 12.4 and it is not clear why the old formulations of the existing Treaty of Rome should now be maintained. 'Shared competences' are by definition to be shared.

If special forms of partnership are really required in R & D and development cooperation, these can be laid down in Part Two.

13.3 Following the logic of shifting employment policy from areas restricted to 'supporting action' to the more fulsome 'shared competence' (see Article 12.4), it would be wise to shift Article 15.3 of the Praesidium's draft into this article which concerns general economic policy of which employment policy will be an integral part.

13.4 All Member States sign up to the objectives and disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union, including membership of the euro, when they join the Union. The presumption of the Constitution should be that all Member States will in the end fulfil these obligations. If specific provisions are needed they should apply to those countries who have yet to reach their goal. The general regime should be designed for those who are fully integrated.

As it stands, the Praesidium’s draft is ambiguous, implying something more than the Stability and Growth Pact but less than the formal procedures for closer cooperation (Article 11 TEC). Such ambiguity in a constitution does not help to reconcile possible political differences between eurozone and non-eurozone members.

14.1 The Praesidium’s commitment to ‘active and unreserved’ support of common foreign and security policy is no doubt well-intentioned but is hardly attuned to reality. There must be scope in Part Two for constructive abstention from joint actions and for the formation of core groups of Member States both capable and willing to act in the vanguard.

Likewise, there must be scope for certain governments to harbour reservations for national political or historic reasons about a position struck by a majority in the Council. The development of CFSP has to be consensual, respecting minority views. The constitution should not impair its development by seeking to impose a uniformity at variance with the reality.

14.2 To be consistent with the present Treaty on European Union, specific mention must be made here of defence policy. The EU Rapid Reaction Force and any future EU military combinations must have a legal basis in the Constitution.

Within the context of a commitment to the collective security of the Union as a whole, obligations to NATO by some Member States and to neutrality by others should be referred to explicitly.

15 This category of competences is not simply that of 'supporting action', and the title and the first sentence of 15.1 should be changed to reflect that.

15.1 The reference to Part Two has already been covered in Article 10.6. It is confusing and unnecessary to repeat it here with slightly different wording.

15.2 In line with our more permissive approach to the delimitation of competences, and our opposition to rigid lists, it would be prudent to qualify this category with the provision that these are only the principal areas of supporting action.

A reference to the tourism sector may be appropriately added here. It is a vital component of the economy and an important factor in European integration.

Effective cooperation between authorities in order to assist the development of border regions is frequently hampered by administrative or cultural obstacles. A specific provision in the Constitution to substantiate EU supporting action in this field is appropriate.

15.3 We have suggested (Article 12.4) that employment policy becomes a shared competence.

16 The term ‘flexibility’ might give the impression that this provision of the Constitution confers a greater permission in terms of general competence than it actually does. It might also be confused with the provisions on closer cooperation which facilitate differentiated integration. This is, more precisely, a clause enabling the institutions to act more effectively within the constitutionally defined parameters of competence rather than for the Union to arrogate to itself a greater attribution of competence.

16.1 Decision making in the Council needs to be assessed here in the context of the broader settlement of the legislative procedures. It is not self-evident why, in the enlarged Union, unanimity should be maintained. Other options include, for example, an enhanced form of QMV. The Convention needs to return to this issue.