Annex 1

Article I-2

Values

1. The inclusion of minority rights is undesirable. The Constitution (notably the Charter) chooses on purpose the individual rights approach and not collective rights. This is the Liberal way.

2. If gender equality is to be included it should be treated as a value and not merely as a valued principle.

Annex 8

Article III-197.3

External Action Service

It is good that this now takes the form of a constitutional article and not just a Declaration. However, the original formula for a 'joint' administration set up by agreement between the Council and Commission, without prejudice to the rights of the European Parliament (for example, in budgetary matters), has been weakened. There is also a potentially worrying distinction between the 'central' service and external delegations.

Annex 10

Article I-54

Multi-annual financial framework

The European Council can decide by QMV to delay the introduction of QMV for the second decision following the signature of the Constitution. In practice, this is likely to be in 2012. This is at least clear.

Annex 11

Article III-310

Budget

Under this proposal, non-action by the Council blocks the budget while non-action by the Parliament causes the budget to be approved. The main substantive change (sub-paragraph 8) is that the Council, acting by QMV, can block the entire budget. Where the Parliament cannot confirm the text of the conciliation committee (acting by 3/5 majority of votes cast) the budget is deemed adopted. Where either party rejects the budget, a new budgetary procedure starts all over again, and the provisional twelfth system is applied if necessary. This proposal maintains a decisive word of the Parliament, although not necessarily the last one. The Parliament will have to take into consideration the possibility of an ultimate Council veto. However, the Council will tend to use its veto sparingly. In practice, the revised system will encourage the co-decisional character of the budgetary procedure.

Best of all would be the Convention's proposals. Worst of all would be Ecofin's proposals. The Presidency's proposals are just acceptable.

Annex 16

Article III-76.12

Excessive deficit procedure

The European Court of Justice is given the right to review infringements of the excessive deficit procedure. This is an advance on the proposals of the Convention.

Annex 18

Article III-171

Judicial cooperation in criminal matters;

and Article III-172

Minimum rules for the common definition of crimes and sanctions

These revisions masquerade as an 'emergency break'. In effect, however, they put an end to co-decision, thereby jeopardising the decision to suppress the Maastricht third pillar. The referral to the European Council on the mere invocation of conflict with the fundamental principles of national judicial system will be an irresistible temptation for those member states that essentially oppose integration in this area.

The insertion of a deadline within which the European Council had to act would at least prevent complete inaction. The better solution would be to return to the Naples formulation (referral to European Council without suspension of co-decision and with time limits). Best of all would be to get the European Council to act by QMV.

Annex 19

Article III-175

Public Prosecutor

The restriction placed on the Public Prosecutor (limited competence to financial interest of the Union) plus the inclusion of a passerelle to future wider competence probably strengthens the consensus.

However, linking the passerelle to the requirement for national ratification negates its purpose. The link should be removed.

Annex 22

Article I-40.6 etc.

Common Security & Defence Policy

These changes are surely now acceptable. They continue to allow the Council to take the decision on structured cooperation by QMV, while preserving unanimity for sending troops to battle. They also permit a country to withdraw from the military cooperation.

Annex 23

Article III-201

Common Foreign & Security Policy

This is the obvious solution that stares everyone in the face. Allow QMV for proposals of the Foreign Minister that define for practical purposes a strategic decision of the European Council. Otherwise there will continue to be very little or no CFSP.

Annex 25

Article III-21

Social security for mobile workers

This provision is emasculated by the insertion of an emergency brake clause allowing referral to the European Council where fundamental principles of national social security systems are concerned. This puts a stop to co-decision.

The solution would be to return to the Naples formulation (referral to European Council without suspension of co-decision and with time limits to force it to act, preferably by QMV).

Annex 26

Article III-62.2

Fiscal provisions

QMV is saved for this controversial article (at least, to the UK) with the strange and unnecessary qualification that the EU tax measures should not affect national tax regimes.

Best to remove the addition for the sake of clarity, transparency and common sense.

Annex 30

Article III-149

Research & development

The reversion to the atypical Council law is a step backwards, especially for the European Parliament which is deprived of its rightful legislative power.

The IGC should go back to the Convention's proposal - which is EU law for the framework programme and Council regulation for implementing the specific programmes.

Annex 35

Article IV-7bis

General passerelle

The European Parliament gains the right of consent (in place of consultation in Article I-24.4), but the new nihil obstat provision for national parliaments means that the instrument will be less useful for the European Council which will find itself highly exposed to domestic political upsets.

The IGC would be wise to shorten the period in which national parliaments need to react from six months to six weeks. Another option would be to increase the objection threshold of national parliaments to one third.

Annex 36

Article IV-7ter

Revision procedures

This is in any case a very modest measure. The only substantive change introduced by this revision is to remove the need for either a Convention or an IGC to draft amendments to Title III of Part III.

A definite and realisable improvement would be to give the European Parliament the right of consent and not just consultation.

Annex 44

Article III-328

Passerelle on enhanced cooperation

The suppression of the specific passerelle for enhanced cooperation means that integration will be forced to take place outside the Union (and the Constitution) in the case that one member of the core group objects to a major policy development.

The article should be reinstated.